The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Volume 31
Issue 1 March - Special Issue on Restorative
Justice and Responsive Regulation

Article 6

March 2004

Managing Social Conflict - The Evolution of a Practical Theory
David B. Moore
Consultant, Sydney, Australia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw
Part of the Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Social Psychology Commons, and the Social Work
Commons

Recommended Citation
Moore, David B. (2004) "Managing Social Conflict - The Evolution of a Practical Theory," The Journal of
Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 31 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol31/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan
University School of Social Work. For more information,
please contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

Managing Social Conflict-The Evolution
of a Practical Theory
DAVID B. MOORE

Consultant, Sydney, Australia

This article describes the co-evolution of a process and a theory. Through
the 1990s, the process known as "conferencing" moved beyond child
welfare and youth justice, to applications in schools, neighbourhoods,
and workplaces. In each of these applications, conferencing has assisted
participants to acknowledge and transform interpersonal conflict, as a
prelude to negotiating a plan of action. Much analysis of conferencing
has been linked with social theorist John Braithwaite, whose work has
influenced the development of a multidisciplinarytheory of these process
dynamics, and the development of guiding principles.Key links between
theory and practice are described in chronologicalsequence.
Key words: Conferencing, conflict management, restorative & transformative justice, deliberativedemocracy

Introduction
This special issue of the Journalof Sociology and Social Welfare
examines a process and a body of theory. The process is known
as "conferencing", and it is being used by a growing number of
professions. Conferencing provides a conversation with a formal
structure, and that structure enables participants to address constructively an incident or issue that has caused significant conflict
between them. Different titles distinguish applications of conferencing in different fields of professional practice such as child
welfare, corrections, and schools. "Family group conferencing"
is a common title when the process is used in social welfare.
Key features are consistent across the various applications of
the conferencing process. In all of them a third party convenor
Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare, March, 2004, Volume XXXI, Number I
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brings together in a circle the group of people affected by the
issue in question. The convenor directs the group's conversation
through a series of stages, the last of which involves developing
an action plan to improve their situation.
A growing body of evidence indicates that conferencing can
improve the quality and quantity of relationships within each
participating community. Various theories have been used to
explain why and to justify the use of family group conferencing
and other versions of the conferencing process. One social theorist
has been particularly prominent in these dialogues and debates.
Braithwaite's theoretical work was first linked with the practice of conferencing in the early 1990s. Accordingly, we have
now had over a decade of dialogue and debate about the fit
between conferencing practice and a body of social theory of
which Braithwaite's work is exemplary. This dialogue of theorists
and practitioners has continued as conferencing has spread well
beyond its initial applications in child welfare and youth justice.
The dialogue has helped keep the conferencing process aligned
with the programs that deliver it, and with underlying principles.
My contribution to this special issue comes out of an unusual
relationship between theory and practice. In the early 1990s, as
academic advisor to a pioneering conferencing program in Australia, I connected the conferencing process with the theory outlined in Braithwaite's (1989) then-just-published Crime, Shame and
Reintegration. I subsequently evaluated aspects of that program
under the aegis of a federally-funded research program.
After working in state government policy development and
program implementation, I co-founded a company to promote
conferencing and related conflict management practices. I was
thus involved in the expansion of conferencing both geographically (to programs in North America and Western Europe), and to
sectors/professions beyond justice and social welfare (including
education, workplace relations, and community development). In
this article, I outline some lessons from this experience of promoting conferencing and related processes within various programs.
These lessons are arranged in chronological order, and are linked
with ideas found in Braithwaite's work.
Some of the lessons discussed here have direct relevance for
social welfare applications of conferencing. Others may be of
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indirect relevance. The one overriding lesson, however, is that
good theory assists good practice. So we must all keep talking,
within and between different fields of professional practice, about
the principles and practices with which we work.
Lesson: Consistently Distinguish Program from Process
The genesis of conferencing programs in New Zealand and
Australia (Australasia) has been described extensively (Hudson
et al., 1996). The New Zealand national parliament legislated in
1989 for the use of family group conferencing to deal with certain
care and protection matters and certain youth justice matters.
New Zealand's Department of Social Welfare was made responsible for delivering both applications of the process. In essence,
the introduction of conferencing into the child welfare and youth
justice systems gave considerable decision-making power to individuals and groups in cases where state officials might previously
have imposed decisions on those individuals.
The program has generally been judged very successful according to a number of measures, both for the individuals and
families involved, and for its positive impact on the youth justice
and care and protection systems. Standard measures include participants' satisfaction with the process. Standard outcome measures
include reduced reoffending, in youth justice cases, and more realistic, safer outcome plans in care and protection matters. Positive
outcomes have been measured qualitatively-through powerful
individual stories-and quantitatively, with impressive statistical
outcomes (See e.g., Maxwell & Morris, 1992; Trimboli, 2000; Luke
& Lind, 2002).
The New Zealand national legislation of 1989 inspired the first
Australian program to use conferencing in youth justice. (This
program began in 1991, in Wagga Wagga, the largest town in
the Riverina agricultural region of southern New South Wales.)
Administrative arrangements for this first Australian conferencing program were rather different from those in New Zealand.
Most obviously, local police administered the program without
the need of new legislation. This was possible because of the size
and structure of the police agency in question, the laws under
which it was operating, and some widespread cultural changes
in contemporary policing.
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The legal space for police to convene a process such as conferencing already existed. Using the British common law principle of "constabular discretion", Australian police officers have,
historically, exercised some freedom to determine how best to
deal with less serious (non-indictable) offences. In each Australian
state, various laws and administrative guidelines have built on
this discretion, introducing diversionary options such as police
cautioning for young people (Seymour, 1988).
The process dynamics of a police caution were generally not
defined with precision. So police in the Wagga Wagga patrol could
establish and administer a program of "effective cautioning using
family group conferencing" (Moore & O'Connell, 1994) under
existing legal and administrative guidelines. The idea was simple.
Here was a new option in cases involving young people aged from
ten to seventeen. The option would be available if one or more
young people had freely admitted their role in a non-indictable
offense, and so could be considered eligible for a police caution,
rather than having their case sent to court. Now, instead of a police
sergeant personally cautioning a young person to desist from
offending behavior, that same sergeant could bring together those
affected by the offending behavior, and convene a conference.
The sergeant would become more of a referee than a player in the
cautioning process.
If structural, legal and administrative factors made all this
possible, what made it desirable-at least to reform-minded local
police officers-was a cultural change in contemporary policing.
The philosophy of community policing had widespread influence
on police policies and procedures through the 1990s (Skolnick &
Bayley, 1988; Moore, 1992) Appropriately, the local 'Beat Police'
Unit administered this Australian pilot program of conferencing
in youth justice. This unit was staffed by the group of officers
expressly dedicated to the philosophy and practice of community
policing.
The police-administered pilot program of conferencing in and
around Wagga Wagga was strongly supported by a coalition of
local professionals with an interest in youth justice and social
welfare. But the program also rapidly attracted attention further
afield. And one reason for that widespread attention was Braithwaite's interest in what soon became known as the Wagga Model.
As always, terminology was very influential here.

ManagingSocial Conflict

75

The word "model" conflated two distinguishing elements of
the arrangements in Wagga: a program administered by the local
community policing unit, and a process that evolved over several
years, as its theory-based design was systematically tested, redesigned, and retested. Using one word, model, to refer to two
elements obscured our understanding of both elements for some
time. But dialogue between theory and practice gradually helped
us distinguish more precisely the program from the process.
As other conferencing programs developed in Australasia,
North America, Western Europe, and South Africa, consistent
concerns were: "What agency should administer the program?"
and "Who should convene conferences?" To those of us observing
the day-to-day workings of the Wagga Model, however, the most
interesting feature was not the set of administrative arrangements for the program but, rather, the process itself. In other
words, it was "What do people actually do when they're in the
room?" rather than "What rules determine who enters the room,
and who administers those rules?" Braithwaite's involvement
with the Wagga Model began with an attempt to answer this
question.
The possibility of establishing a conferencing program in
Wagga had been first formally raised at a meeting of academics,
social services and justice professionals, and local city administrators. I attended that meeting as coordinator of a "justice studies"
program offered nationally from the local university campus.
Now a group of local service providers was considering establishing a program. To do so properly required a clearly articulated
explanation of what we (thought we) were doing. Braithwaite's
Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989) seemed to provide a theoretical counterpart to the process of family group conferencingat least in its youth justice applications. Braithwaite's theory of
reintegrative shaming provided a basis for philosophical reflection and an analytical framework for action research. We would
probably need to adjust process and program-the practice. We
might need to adjust the guiding principles-the theory. But without a working hypothesis for what conferencing was, we couldn't
begin this dialogue of theory and practice.
In essence, Crime, Shame and Reintegration offered a metaanalysis of major schools of criminology. Rather than emphasizing points of difference, Braithwaite provided a fair-minded
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summary of these schools, and an overview of the empirical
data that support their respective theoretical claims. The result
can be compared to a Venn diagram. At its center are points
of commonality in theories about what causes crime, and what
causes people to desist from crime.
Braithwaite's theoretical synthesis suggested-not surprisingly-that the more people have to lose from involvement in
crime, the more likely they are to desist from criminal activity.
Crucially, this is not a simplistic material analysis.Rather, it places
adequate emphasis on psycho-social factors such as a sense of
personal control and the presence of social support. If individuals
feel they have some sense of dignity, a sense of hope for the future,
and significant positive relationships, then they have a great deal
to lose from behavior that damages those relationships.
Such ideas seem commonsense to professionals in social welfare and social work. The ideas can also be theorized in terms
of family systems and social networks. Some of the activists who
had pushed for reform of New Zealand's child welfare and youth
justice systems had expressed similar views. Appropriately, some
criminological research in New Zealand at this time was producing much the same findings (Leibrich, 1995). And these theories
about reintegration had significant policy implications (Braithwaite & Mugford, 1994).
The terminology of reintegration was chosen as a counterpoint to a famous phrase in North American legal sociology.
In the 1950s, Harold Garfinkel had articulated "conditions of
successful degradation ceremonies." Garfinkel was suggesting
ways to strengthen symbolic messages of social disapproval sent
by the criminal justice system (Garfinkel, 1956). From a strong
base of evidence, Braithwaite was now suggesting the opposite
approach. He was arguing for a strategy of reintegrating rather
than "degrading"-stigmatizing and segregating-people who
had caused social harm.
At the core of the theory was not just a suggestion, based on
strong sociologicalevidence, for decreasing reoffending by increasing social support. There was also a psychological claim about the
nature of processes, or "ceremonies." The claim was captured in
the title of the book: in the wake of a crime, social reintegration
becomes possible once there has been an understanding of the
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harm caused and an expression of remorse in a supportive setting.
At the core of this expression of remorse is a feeling of shame.
Braithwaite has since continued to speculate about the larger
social dimensions of stigmatization and reintegration, of how
what is considered shameful or not influences social regulation.
This work is typically both descriptive and prescriptive, and it addresses some very broad themes (Braithwaite, 2002). But already,
while the theory still specifically concerned formal responses to
criminal behavior, it raised very broad questions.
As one looked for points of commonality between Braithwaite's theory and related theories across the spectrum of social science and humanities disciplines, the area that seemed
most to warrant more careful attention was that of psychology
(Moore, 1993). In particular, the theory of "reintegrative shaming"
begged the question of whether emotions-and specifically the
emotion of shame-were human universals or were "culturally
specific." Empirical evidence from conferencing prompted speculation here. As many conference evaluators and convenors have
since noted, despite all the differences from one case to the next,
a strikingly similar emotional dynamic seems to recur in conferences, irrespective of the nature of the case, the numbers present,
or their cultural backgrounds. (Moore with Forsythe, 1995)
Convenors ask questions in a particular sequence, encouraging participants to paint a picture of what happened and how
people have been affected, before considering how the situation
might be improved. As these questions are asked and answered,
the group as a whole seem to move through a series of stages.
Each of these stages is dominated by a small number of emotions.
Cognitive psychology, with its emphasis on conscious decisionmaking, did not adequately explain this group psychological
dynamic. Nor did psychodynamic theory, with its emphasis on unconscious drives. Nor did behavioristpsychology, which provided
a description of behavior rather than a theory of psychology.
I had noted that there was indeed a profound emotional turning point in the latter half of most well-convened conferences.
It marked the point at which participants could begin working
constructively towards a plan of action for making things better.
Initially, this turning point seemed consistent with the theory of
psychological process hypothesized by Braithwaite: a sense of
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shame would be experienced once the full social effects of harmful
behavior had been explained by those most affected, and had
been understood. And because this shame was experienced in a
supportive setting, it could be a prelude to social reintegrationrather than stigmatization and segregation. But closer observation suggested that this theory needed modification in a subtle
but profound aspect.
After observing many conferences, after audio-recording and
analyzing transcripts, comparing filmed role-played conferences
with the 'real thing', and interviewing observers, convenors and
participants at length, a key feature of this emotional turning
point in conferences was clear. It was not an experience confined
to any one individual. Rather, all of those present experienced
something profound. They experienced a moment of "collective
vulnerability", as a Canadian colleague described it in a training
workshop. It was several years before we articulated adequately
the emotional sequence leading to and following this turning
point in the conferencing process. (A brief account is provided
below.)
Meanwhile, justice system programs used some or all of the
convenors' (process) training that a group of us involved with the
program in Wagga had developed. So too did the first programs
in schools, neighbourhoods and workplaces. Indeed, the only
professional domains where conferencing was applied with little
reference to this process seem to have been social welfare and
social work (see Ban, 2000; Cashmore & Kiely, 2000; Burford &
Hudson, 2000). And until fairly recently, there has been only
limited dialogue between social services and other applications of
conferencing. But inter-professional dialogue about conferencing
is now increasing, and one reason seems to be a common interest
in an adequately articulated psychosocial theory of the process.
As conferencing programs are established in various fields, more
and more practitioners have observed the need to look more
deeply, to pay closer attention to the dynamics of conferencing
and related processes.
Paradoxically, a better understanding of the process dynamic
was assisted by the parallel project of looking more broadly, of reconsidering the principles that the conferencing process seemed to
exemplify. Reconsidering the guiding or foundational principles
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of conferencing made it easier to see the process through different
lenses.
Lesson: Distinguish Principlesfrom Program and Process
Through the 1990s, a great deal was learned from programs
that applied the conferencing process in different settings, in
Australia, North America, Western Europe and elsewhere. New
Zealand's national legislation provided for conferencing in care
and protection matters and in youth justice, all under the administrative aegis of the Department of Social Welfare. In contrast, the
first youth justice conferencing program in New South Wales was
administered by police, as was the first large random-allocation
study of conferencing, which began in the Australian Capital
Territory in 1994 (Sherman et. al., 1998).
Some local police patrols (in other states and the Northern
Territory, and especially in rural and remote areas) replicated the
Wagga model. In other words, they used the training methodology we had developed, and administered a diversionary program
of "effective cautioning using conferencing." (Nearly a decade
later, working with reformers within the Northern Territory Government, we used the same model to provide a humane alternative to the Territory's notorious mandatory sentencing laws.)
Meanwhile, in 1993, South Australia passed the first Australian statewide legislation for conferencing in youth justice. Although much of the framework was influenced by New Zealand's
legislation, the program was administered by the South Australian Courts Administration Authority, which, in turn, established a semi-autonomous Conferencing Unit. Schools also began
to use the process, with initiative taken variously at the level of
individual schools, districts (boards), and statewide departments
(Cameron & Thorsborne, 2001). In Canada and the United States
from 1994, some schools and police agencies began to use versions
of the training material developed in Australia.
Social welfare applications of the process were piloted with
various administrative arrangements, including grant-funded
dispute settlement agencies, faith-based organizations, and government agencies (Burford & Hudson, 2000). In a further significant variation, conferencing was also used to address conflict
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in inner city neighborhoods (Abramson & Moore, 2002). Finally,
as far as we know, the first regular formal use of conferencing to
address conflict in workplaces began in New South Wales in 1995,
after a group of us founded Transformative Justice Australia.
In all these applications, one of the attractions of the conferencing process was that it seemed more than just a process. To
bring a group of people into a circle, and to enable them to deal
constructively with problems that affected everybody present,
seemed consistent with various aspirational political philosophies. For instance, conferencing could be seen as an example of
participatory democracy. It could be seen as realizing some practical middle ground between liberal and communitarian philosophies of civic involvement (Moore, 1993).
Likewise, in justice system applications, the process seemed
consistent with a "republican" model proposed by Braithwaite
and philosopher Phillip Pettit, whereby justice processes and
systems are judged according to the degree to which they increase
or decrease the "dominion" of those affected (Braithwaite & Pettit,
1990). The process also seemed to have much in common with
other interventions informed by family systems theory or practices such as narrative therapy (White & Epston, 1990; Niemeyer,
2001; Perry, 2002). Finally, conferencing seemed consistent with
the movement for restorative justice (Moore with Forsythe, 1995).
Much of the theoretical discussion about conferencing through
the latter half of the 1990s was subsumed by debate and dialogue
conducted in the language of restorative justice. In retrospect,
it seems that this development may have constrained unduly
thinking about conferencing, and may have temporarily limited
applications of the process. To understand how this occurred,
we need to consider the origins of the modern restorative justice
movement.
A theoretical distinction between retribution and restoration
or reconciliation had long existed in jurisprudence and in social
theory-for instance, in the work of G.H. Mead (1917-18). The
distinction was also part of older faith traditions. In the Christian
tradition, an emphasis on the restoring power of forgiveness
was particularly strong in Anabaptist--Quaker and Mennonitecommunities. So it was perhaps not surprising that Mennonite
activists played a significant role in developing the process known
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as "victim-offender reconciliation." The acronym "VORP" was
derived from victim-offender reconciliation programs developed
in the mid-1970s, first in Ontario, then Indiana and various other
US states and Canadian provinces.
These developments have been well chronicled in an ongoing
series of anthologies edited by Burt Galaway, Joe Hudson and colleagues (see also Zehr, 1990). Contributing writer/practitioners
typically offer a general critique of the criminal justice system,
wish to improve the wellbeing of all those affected by crime, and,
specifically, wish to create circumstances whereby those affected
can themselves address the specific harm they have experienced
and deal with perceived underlying causes (Daly & Immarigeon, 1998).
Through the 1980s, this philosophy of restorative justice was
represented primarily by one process. It was called either Victim
Offender Reconciliation-a term that emphasized the desired
outcome--or Victim Offender Mediation (VOM)-a phrase that
emphasized process. Through the 1990s, however, conferencing,
circle sentencing and other processes were also deemed exemplary restorative justice processes. Chapters and articles were
published with grids comparing and contrasting their similarities
and differences (e.g., Bazemore & Umbreit, 2002) And there are
indeed many procedural and philosophical similarities between
these processes, and practitioners generally have similar goals.
A key administrative or program difference between conferencing, victim-offender mediation and circle sentencing is that circle
sentencing is typically an alternativeto traditional court, victimoffender mediation typically an adjunct,while conferencing can be
both alternative and adjunct. But the more significant differences
concern process dynamics. (The following generalizations apply
in most though perhaps not all cases.)
Conferencing seemed to differ from circle sentencing in its
definition of community, with greater emphasis on the community of family, friends and/or colleagues, and somewhat less
emphasis on state officials. Conferencing also differed from circle
sentencing in its explicit definition of the collective agreement
reached by participants as something other than a sentence.
This difference is partly a function of where in the system these
two processes are used. But the difference arises also because
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conferencing explicitly asks different questions from those traditionally asked by the criminal legal system. The traditional social
welfare and justice systems have both asked: Who is our subject
and what do we do to them? Conferencing, in contrast, asks: What
has happened? How have people been affected? What do we now do to
make things better?
This difference in the focus of proceedings is also true of
Victim Offender Mediation. Conferencing is not designed primarily for victims, nor for perpetrators. It is equally for all those
other participants who attend. It is for anybody who, by virtue
of friendship, family or professional relations, has been affected
by what happened. So conferencing seems to differ from VOM in
its emphasis on the whole community of people affected by an
incident or incidents and the associated conflict.
Secondly, conferencing is designed for cases where interpersonal conflict is the presenting problem. The theory that we developed to understand conferencing and to guide conferencing
convenors explicitly distinguishes conflicts from disputes (Moore
& McDonald, 2001). A dispute requires two parties, and it requires
a set of facts around which the dispute occurs. It need not involve
negative feelings.
Conflict is more general, is associated with strongly negative
feelings, and may be experienced within a person, within a group,
and/or between groups. So a dispute may cause conflict, and a
state of conflict may generate disputes. But conflict can exist in
the absence of any specific dispute. In other situations, disputes
can be resolved without conflict. Different approaches may be
required for each type of situation.
Accordingly, from the mid 1990s, I emphasized the need to
distinguish three approaches to conflict: (1) maximizing conflict,
as a side effect of adversarial dispute resolution; (2) minimizing conflict, as a tactic in the non-adversarial dispute resolution
process of assisted negotiation known as (interest-based) mediation; (3) acknowledging and transforming conflict, the optimal
approach where specific disputes are merely symptoms of more
general conflict, or when there is conflict but no dispute.
For instance, when someone admits having acted in ways that
offended against and victimized others, there is undisputed harm.
In other words, there is not necessarily any dispute. Accordingly,
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the primary need is not to negotiate, using a process designed to
minimize conflict. Rather, the primary need is to acknowledge the
conflict between people and, if possible, to transform that conflict
into cooperation. Conferencing is designed expressly to do this.
So this was a subtle but significant difference between conferencing and the model of mediation-as-assisted-negotiation that
we understood to have been adopted on behalf of perpetrators
and victims of crime (Moore, 2000). The distinction between these
processes is similar to that made between "interest-based" and
"transformative" models of mediation. But the conferencing process has a more specific structure than most models of transformative mediation. And it is informed by a psychosocial theory
about the emotional stages that this structure allows (Moore &
Abramson, 2002).
A further interesting difference between conferencing and
VOM is the direction in which these processes have promoted
reform. The mediation process was developed for Alternative
Dispute Resolution in other fields, and then introduced to the
justice system by reformers (Umbreit, 1994). Conferencing, conversely, was first used in justice and child welfare applications,
then implemented in successful programs in other regulatory
systems.
So what is it about the theoretical basis and structure of conferencing that have made it suitable for systemic reform outside the
justice and child welfare systems? This is a question about process
and principles. It links neatly with a debate that was occurring
by the early 2000s concerning the nature of restorative justice
programs. Strang, a colleague of Braithwaite's at the Australian
National University, suggested that differences in national culture
help explain differences in the restorative justice movement in
Europe, North America and Australasia.
Strang perceived a distinction between a "support-focused"
victims' movement in Europe and its counterpart in the United
States, which has a stronger "rights-focus." Many readers will
recognize the parallel between this dichotomy and Gilligan's
(1982) competing ethics of care and of justice. Strang suggests that
Australian restorative justice programs have taken a third way,
moving beyond the dichotomy of justice versus care. She provides
examples from RISE (the Reintegrative Shaming Experiment), a
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randomized controlled evaluation of conferencing in Canberra
that was inspired by the program in Wagga Wagga. (A Justice
Research Consortium, with the backing of the Home Office, has
been implementing this evaluation on a much wider scale in the
United Kingdom since 2001, when we trained the first group of
convenors for that program.)
RISE researchers in Canberra found that victims of crime
whose case went to conference rather than court were presented
with greater opportunities for material reparation, yet they were
less likely to ask for money as part of the case outcome. They
were significantly less distressed and angry, and rated higher
in sympathy and trust, than the control group. This effect was
most pronounced for victims of violent crime. Four times as
many conference victims received an apology. Conference victims
were more satisfied with the information about case processing
and outcomes, the opportunity to participate in the development
of case outcomes, and the "fair and respectful treatment" they
received (Strang, 2002).
Cultural and institutional variations may well account for
significant differences in the victims' movement in Europe and
North America, and, indeed, in many other parts of the world.
They may well provide part of the explanation for this apparent
third way in Australasia. But a procedural factor seems at least
as significant, namely that the victims interviewed in Strang's
Australian evaluation had attended a conference. In other words,
they had participated in a process designed expressly to answer
the sorts of concerns traditionally raised by victims of crime.
As Strang's study reminds us, research shows consistent criticisms of the justice system. Its processes are perceived as unfair, as
are the outcomes that those processes generate. People affected by
crime feel excluded from decision-making, and outcomes tend to
neglect non-material dimensions.
People in many other situations express similar concerns.
Conferencing seems to address concerns raised by victims of
crime about process and outcome, for the same reasons it is
judged positively in other situations where participants have been
in conflict. In all these situations, the primary problem is not
a dispute. There is either undisputed harm, or there are many
poorly resolved disputes associated with the conflict. Either way,
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an effective process will need systematically to revisit the key
causes and consequences of conflict.
For this reason, I suggested it was not accurate to interpret
conferencing as third-party assisted negotiation with extra participants. Analysis of the process dynamics reveals that the differences between these processes are more significant than who is in
the room (Moore, 2000). To use phrases associated with the work
of the Harvard negotiation project, the structure of conferences
enables participants to systematically "get to peace" before they
seek to "get to yes" (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991). And a key tactic
for getting to peace is to engage a whole social network.
For the same reasons, it seems not quite accurate to call conferencing a victim-offender process. Even when conferencing in
the justice system deals with an incident involving a single perpetrator and single direct victim of a crime, many other people
will have been affected. And if conferencing is the process used to
address the associated conflict, then many people should attend
the conference. Again, the process is for all of them.
Likewise, it seems not quite accurate to call conferencing
specifically an exemplar of restorative justice. Yes, it is a process
that can be used in justice systems. It may indeed restore some
elements of the situation-perhaps a sense of relative harmony
or some similar psychological and/or social factor. But the more
striking feature of a process that engages a whole social network
in conflict is less restoration and more transformation. For this
reason, in the mid-1990s, we adopted the hybrid term "transformative justice" (which was at that time most associated with
Canadian activist, the late Ruth Morris (Morris, 2000).
This term "transformative justice" is a hybrid in the sense
that it combines information about process and system. The word
"transformative" refers to the change in participants' perspectives
and feelings, as they work towards an agreement to transform
their circumstances.
So what was the defining essence of conferencing in its various
applications? Again, it seemed not quite accurate to describe
conferencing primarily as an example of participatory democracy.
Yes, the guiding principles for convenors of participation, equity,
deliberation and non-tyranny are those of deliberative democratic
process (Moore & McDonald, 2001). But to define conferencing in
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these terms is to risk emphasizing process over outcome. Which
again begs the key questions: What is the generic desired outcome
of conferencing?
Lesson: The Generic Process and
Outcome is Conflict Management
A generic desired outcome of conferencing only became clear
once the process had been observed in three and more specific
program applications. Only then did broader patterns appear beyond the administrative concerns and risk minimization practices
specific to that agency or profession.
Social welfare programs have tended to adopt conferencing
(and, indeed, Alternative Dispute Resolution process generally)
in response to concerns that a social services system was disempowering. Conferencing increases client participation while
being consistent with family systems theory and other key ideas
informing contemporary welfare practice. So a key desired outcome of conferencing in social welfare has been empowerment.
Justice system reformers have tended to promote conferencing for multiple reasons. Key desired outcomes include reducing
the rate of reoffending relative to other interventions, diversion
from the formal system, a voice for victims of crime, a more
general sense of participation for those affected by crime, and
even strengthened communities.
Some of these outcomes have also appealed to members of
school communities. But conferencing has appealed above all
to those schools seeking a "whole school approach to behavior
management", and appropriate responses to behaviors such as
harassment and bullying. A system goal, in many cases, has been
to reduce the alarmingly high rates of suspension and exclusion
from schools in the wake of such behaviors.
In welfare, justice and schools applications, program administrators are dealing with relatively (and in some cases literally)
captive audiences. Conferencing had only to be more appealing
than the alternative processes to be judged positively by participants. But the situation in workplaces is rather different. In
many cases, the argument for conferencing had to be put far
more persuasively if work colleagues were voluntarily to attend
a conference. And it was when we began offering conferencing in
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industrial/organizational settings that the need for a more thorough paradigm shift became glaringly obvious. As it happens, the
exercise of revisiting our original hypothesis about conferencing
in the justice system helped articulate this new paradigm.
Close observation of conference dynamics suggested two key
modifications to the theory that Braithwaite had postulated in
Crime, Shame and Reintegration, and that we had applied to conferencing. First, the use of conferencing was clearly not confined
to single incidents of undisputed harm, although the process was
used overwhelmingly for such cases in the justice system.
Second, the key process dynamic was not that shame was
induced in one individual. Rather, the key emotional shifts in the
process were collective. They occurred as participants reflected
on a complex picture of how things were, mapped each person's
contribution to what happened, and gained a shared understanding and feeling that "we're all in this together."
What seemed to be happening physiologically was a shift in
affects, or "basic emotions." The shift begins from the moment the
convenor, quite transparently, shifts the focus from judgements
about individuals to analysis of actions and/or events. This shift
in subject matter begins the first affective shift, from emotions
most associated with conflict-anger, fear and contempt-to the
emotions of distress, disgust and surprise. These emotions are
consistently expressed about harmful actions (in cases where the
conference is dealing with undisputed harm), and/or about the
general set of circumstances (in cases where the conference is
addressing many disputes).
When a picture has been painted, collectively, of what has
happened and how people have been affected, the convenor
creates a space for reflection, asking some or all participants
whether they have anything to add. This is a logical break, the
divide between looking at the past and the present, and looking
to the future. Again, in parallel with the structural logic of the
process, this is also a profound affective turning point. Various
metaphors describe the physiology of participants at this point.
They will, for instance, look as though they have "had the wind
knocked out of their sails."
This is where an argument for cultural distinctions in the
understanding of emotion might be particularly relevant. Our
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understanding of what is happening here is that participants
are experiencing a human universal, the state triggered when a
positive emotional experience is abruptly but incompletely interrupted. And this affective state is amplified, as is any strong
affective state, by being experienced collectively. It is triggered as
participants reflect on how things got worse, and it is amplified
because they have reflected collectively on that question. (The
theory that seems best to explain this phenomenon is affect theory.
For more on this theory and its significance for conferencing, see
Demos, 1994; Moore & Abramson, 2002).
Although justice system applications of conferencing dealt
with undisputed harm that had been categorized as criminal,
what conference participants were ultimately addressing was not
the crime as such. Rather they were addressing the conflict associated with crime. As the sources of conflict were identified and
acknowledged, participants experienced an emotional transformation, then developed a plan to transform their circumstances.
In short, the process dynamic was "conflict, acknowledgment and
transformation." (Moore & McDonald, 2001)
This distinction between crime and conflict associated with
crime became more obvious as conferencing began to be used
further within the formal justice system, rather than as a diversionary option. In conferencing programs supported and/or
administered by corrections departments, conferencing is an autonomous adjunct to all the usual processes associated with judging, sentencing and treating. A trial resolves a dispute about
culpability. Sentencing imposes some form of (punitive and/or
therapeutic) treatment. But conferencing provides an opportunity to address interpersonal conflict that a system of imposed
punishment and/or therapy is simply not equipped to provide.
Importantly, this theoretical model-that causes of conflict are
acknowledged and there is some sort of associated transformation
-does not assume that conflict will necessarily be resolved. It
is more accurate to think of conflict as being managed. In some
cases, attitudes towards others may not change significantly. Conflict will be managed by a mutual agreement to alter behaviors,
procedures and so on.
But systematically mapping what factors contributed to the
conflict helps ensure that any plan of action is likely to be fair and
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realistic and stands the best chance of being implemented. There
may be less transformation as a result of the process, and more
transformation as a result of the outcome. Change comes from an
action plan that is put into practice in the following weeks and
months.
In some applications of conferencing, too much can be made
of this distinction between process and outcome. It is perfectly
understandable that government-backed programs should emphasize outcome plans; agencies require tangible outcomes and
some official record of those outcomes. But an action plan is of
minor importance to participants in some conferences. Again, this
tends to be most obvious in serious cases of undisputed harm.
Participants sometimes say that gaining a shared understanding of the tragic events allows them to continue with their lives.
As a father who had lost his only daughter expressed it: "The
process is the outcome."
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